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1. Disagreement and dialogue types
The paper addresses a very interesting and potentially controversial issue, namely the
relationship between disagreements and dialogue shifts. The author advances the claim that
negotiation is an instrument for managing disagreements, provided that two conditions apply:
1. The disagreement must be practical rather than theoretical
2. The parties must be willing to make a sacrifice in order to arrive at a compromise; more
specifically, they must be willing to sacrifice their epistemic goal in favor of their social
goal.
The author, thus, conceives the “negotiation of disagreements is a type of practical
argumentation” (p. 2). Like in practical argumentation, the author argues, the parties are
making a decision in order to achieve the most satisfying (the best) result. In disagreements,
different considerations are assessed in order to end the discussion and reach an agreement –
which can be based not on the “absolute” best, but on the relative one.
The author’s argumentation is based on Walton’s (among many others’) distinction
between “practical” and “theoretical” disagreements, which is in turn grounded on the classical
theoretical vs. practical nature of a claim (or even knowledge) (Ryle, 1949). However, as the
author points out, this distinction can be problematic when we try to determine the conditions
of the shift to a negotiation dialogue. The author points out that, while theoretical
disagreements cannot be shifted to negotiation, practical ones can (p. 5), as the commitments
and more importantly the relationship between the parties’ commitments are different in the
two cases. In theoretical disagreements, the parties have clashing commitments over the truth
(or rather, in argumentation, the “acceptability”) of a viewpoint, while in practical ones their
clash concerns the commitments to the desirability of a state of affairs or an action.
However, the author underscores that this view hides some essential aspects of practical
disagreements. The first dimension concerns the type of commitments that the parties have, as
a practical disagreement is characterized, according to the author, by four conditions: (1) two
or more parties have desires over a state of affairs; (2) those desires are clashing with each
other; (3) the parties have agency over the desired state of affairs; and (4) the parties are willing
or forced to act upon the desired state of affairs. The second dimension is the cognitive and
evaluative dimension of a practical decision (and thus a practical disagreement). As the whole
Aristotelian tradition underscores, from Book 2 and 3 of Aristotle’s Topics to the approaches
to decision-making in the medieval time (for a review, see Macagno & Walton 2018) practical
reasoning (a term that can be taken to include the two schemes of argument from consequences
and from practical reasoning) presupposes an evaluation of a state of affairs (based on
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heuristics) (von Wright, 1963). More importantly, any decision-making presupposes a
definition – or “classification” – of the state of affairs that is intended to be changed (Schiappa,
2003). Thus, as the author underlines, practical disagreements (such as disagreements about
policies) can presuppose differences in how a state of affairs is evaluated or classified, making
the distinction between negotiation and persuasion sometimes hard to trace (for the same point,
see Provis, 2004).
The author’s contribution is to take into account the social dimension of argumentation,
where not only the “truth” is considered (whatever it means), but more importantly the “social
goal” of argumentation, the “costs and dangers” of not reaching an agreement from the point
of view of the relationship and the arguer’s ethos. Thus, negotiation is regarded as a tool for
reaching a view that is good enough for both speakers – a tradeoff, which can be of desires, or
evaluations or even a description of a state of affairs. The author then redefines negotiation as
a “type of practical argumentation were the parties adjust their goals or their means-goal
relationship, in accordance with the social situation” (p. 13), and concludes that disagreement
management is a type of negotiation, and this type of negotiation is a form of practical
argumentation.
2. The meaning of negotiation
The contribution of this paper is grounded on some basic concepts: “negotiation,” “practical
argumentation,” and “persuasion.” The author considers them from a dialectical perspective;
thus, the basic reference is the set of works that defined them in the first place. In argumentation
theory, the notion of negotiation has been introduced as a type of dialogue, and more
importantly as a type of dialogue that has some defining features that distinguish it from other
types of dialogue (D. Walton, 1989).
The first crucial aspect is the notion of dialogue, defined based on three criteria: two or
more participants, speech acts (or dialogue acts) exchanged, and the interconnection between
them (relevance) (D. Walton 1989, p. 1, 2004, 1999, p. 36). Thus, since negotiation is a type
of dialogue (an activity), the generic category under which the author claims to classify it needs
to be a type of dialogue. Therefore, it is possible to infer that “practical argumentation” is for
the author a dialogue, or more precisely a dialogue type with characteristics that are broader
than negotiation. This claim cannot be taken for granted, as the tradition seems to maintain a
very different view. Practical arguments have been traditionally seen as arguments, namely
instruments aimed at addressing a doubt or a difference based on a premises that, through a
rule of inference (a topos or locus), increase the acceptability of the conclusion (D. Walton,
1990). The modern approaches to practical reasoning are compatible with the concept of
practical arguments, but apart from the pragmatic goal of pursuing a goal that is related to a
dialogical context, an argument cannot be confused with a dialogue. The author uses the term
“practical argumentation” but since it cannot be the same as practical argument or practical
reasoning, one is left with the question of what the author means with this phrase. The best
candidate is “deliberation,” whose relationship with persuasion, value reasoning, classification,
and negotiation has been thoroughly explored by Walton (for the latest developments, see D.
Walton & Toniolo 2016; D. Walton, Toniolo, & Norman 2014; 2016).
However, the author seems to have something else in mind when he cites a “practical
argumentation” structure. The idea the author uses is a refinement of a structure presented in
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), which is just an adaptation of Walton’s (1990) practical
reasoning and its interrelation with the argument from values and classification (see the detaile
outline of the model in Bench-Capon, 2003; Atkinson & Bench-Capon, 2007; Atkinson,
Bench-Capon & McBurney, 2006). Despite its different name, “practical argumentation,” as
shown, is nothing else than a practical argument, whose inferential relations are not modeled
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nor explained as all the literature on this topic does instead. In the literature, the notion of “best”
outcome has never been considered as an “absolute” perfection of means; rather, Walton
(1990), and other authors working on this issue, points out the relative nature of the “best”
means, namely the most acceptable means given the values and the conditions. In this sense, I
do not see anything new in the scheme the author proposes – just a less specific description of
what has been done before. Moreover, considering that this is the understanding of “practical
reasoning,” I cannot see how a type of dialogue can be a type of argument. Simply, the two
constructs are not comparable – arguments can be used in a dialogue, but surely an argument
is not a type of dialogue.
The second dimension of negotiation is its features. The notion of negotiation described
by Walton is defined by and based on three dimensions: an initial situation, the participant’s
goal, and the goal of the dialogue. Negotiation is thus defined in contrast with both deliberation
and persuasion, as follows (D. Walton, 2006, p. 183; 1989, p. 8):
Type of Dialogue Initial Situation

Participant’s Goal

Goal of The Dialogue

Negotiation

Get what you most
want
Persuade other party

Reasonable settlement
that both can live with
Resolve or clarify issue

Co-ordinate goals and
actions

Decide best available
course of action

Persuasion
Deliberation

Conflict of
interests
Conflict of
opinions
Dilemma or
practical choice

Negotiation and deliberation have very different starting points: while deliberation stems from
a practical choice, and, more importantly, a need of coordination of the interlocutors’ actions
to pursue a goal that is shared (at different levels and stages), negotiation starts from a personal
goal that is in conflict with another’s. Walton’s account is grounded on the concept of
negotiation commonly used in negotiation theory (R. Walton & McKersie, 1965, pp. 2–3), in
which four subtypes are distinguished: (a) Distributive bargaining (zero-sum game), (b)
Integrative bargaining (positive-sum game), (c) Attitudinal structuring (managing the
relationship between the participants), and (d) Intraorganizational bargaining (bringing the
expectations of one side of a wider negotiation process into alignment) (Fisher, Ury, & Patton
1981). Now, these four types involve making decisions—integrative and distributive
bargaining, acknowledged by Walton and McKersie (1965), are types of joint decision-making
processes. However, they are not deliberation dialogues in the sense of Walton’s dialogue
types, as what is in common in distributive bargaining is very little—the rules of a game in
some cases—and certainly not the goal intended as the participants’ goal.
The author illustrates his point with the following example (p. 10):
Party A and Party B disagree about the level of renewable energy that should be
used by 2020. Party A proposes a 18% and party B a 14%. After trying to persuade
each other providing several reasons they arrive at a stalemate: no party has been
able to persuade the other. Therefore, they decide to split the difference at 16%.
Clearly, without the overall dialogue, it is almost impossible to analyze this case. However,
some questions can be raised. The author analyzes it as a two-step dialogical process: first, the
parties engage in a persuasion dialogue, and second, they start a negotiation. The problem is
why this is considered as a type of negotiation. According to Walton’s types of dialogue, it
fails to fulfill the conflict of interests—and goals—as both parties are just trying to make a joint
decision on what both needs to achieve. Is it a bargaining? If this is a discussion of a policy, it
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seems that the parties are not trying to get what they want, but to make a decision (using
practical reasoning arguments) that takes into account not only the positive consequences of
getting the “best” gas reduction, but also the negative one of not getting to a gas reduction soon
enough, etc. Also, the personal relationship can be accounted in this model. Going back to the
standard model of practical reasoning (Walton, 2007), the parties are just making a joint
decision evaluating the alternatives.
Walton indicated as a criterion (the “test”) for distinguishing negotiation from other
types of dialogue the possibility of threats, which are allowed and indeed common in
negotiations, but fallacious tactics in other types of dialogue. Clearly, without a context it is
impossible to analyze this case. The author, however, should see whether threats would be
allowed in this circumstance (“If you do not lower emissions, I will block your proposal in the
commission”). If this is the case, why use persuasion in the first place? Similarly, other cases
(such as the restaurant case) seem to be clear cases of deliberation, where the participants have
a common interest and common goals, and, at a certain point. they can shift to negotiation if
their interest collide. The context, however, does not allow one to understand why these cases
are negotiation, as it is unclear how the dialogue is developed and why the interests are in
conflict.
3. Conclusion
To conclude, the author intends to classify disagreement management as a type of negotiation,
as negotiation is a type of practical argumentation. The concepts used, however, are ill defined,
and the notion of practical argumentation mentioned is at best confusing. If we define the terms
used, we can see how deliberation and negotiation are distinct types of dialogue. If we regard
practical reasoning arguments as arguments, we can see how the conclusion that a certain
course of actions is more preferable than another is the result of different types of
considerations, without redefining activities that imply dialogical settings, roles, attitudes, and
rules that are different. This leads one to wonder whether it is possible to explain the examples
as different uses of practical reasoning arguments. If we go back to the examples presented by
the author, this possibility cannot be excluded. While dialectical shifts are common, it is risky
to claim that negotiation is a type of deliberation, as the dialectical roles of the participants are
redefined in this shift, allowing types of dialogical and dialectical behaviors that would not be
possible in deliberation or persuasion dialogue. The risk is to redefine a concept without any
need, and to multiply theoretical constructs.
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